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Abstract—With the advance in mobile computing, Internet of
Things, and ubiquitous wireless connectivity, social sensing based
edge computing (SSEC) has emerged as a new computation
paradigm where people and their personally owned devices
collect sensor measurements from the physical world and process
them at the edge of the network. This paper focuses on a privacy-
aware task allocation problem where the goal is to optimize the
computation task allocation in SSEC systems while respecting the
users’ customized privacy settings. It introduces a novel Game-
theoretic Privacy-aware Task Allocation (G-PATA) framework to
achieve the goal. G-PATA includes (i) a bottom-up game-theoretic
model to generate the maximum payoffs at end devices while
satisfying the end user’s privacy settings; (ii) a top-down incentive
scheme to adjust the rewards for the tasks to ensure that the
task allocation decisions made by end devices meet the Quality of
Service (QoS) requirements of the applications. Furthermore, the
framework incorporates an efficient load balancing and iteration
reduction component to adapt to the dynamic changes in status
and privacy configurations of end devices. The G-PATA frame-
work was implemented on a real-world edge computing platform
that consists of heterogeneous end devices (Jetson TX1 and TK1
boards, and Raspberry Pi3). We compare G-PATA with state-
of-the-art task allocation schemes through two real-world social
sensing applications. The results show that G-PATA significantly
outperforms existing approaches under various privacy settings
(our scheme achieved as much as 47% improvements in delay
reduction for the application and 15% more payoffs for end
devices compared to the baselines.).
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH ubiquitous Internet connectivity and the prolifer-ation of portable devices, social sensing has become a
new sensing paradigm for collecting real-time measurements
about the physical world from humans or mobile devices
on their behalf [1]. Examples of social sensing applications
include obtaining real-time situation awareness in the af-
termath of a disaster using self-reported observations from
citizens [2], monitoring the air quality of a city using inputs
from people with portable sensors [3], and detecting real-
time traffic congestion using mobile phone apps of drivers [4].
Recent development of edge computing pushes the frontier of
computation, service, and data collection to the edge of the
network [5], [6], and brings new opportunities for social sens-
ing applications. By adopting edge computing, social sensing
applications can offload both the sensing and computational
tasks to privately-owned smart devices (e.g., smart phones
and nodes in the Internet of Things). We refer to this new
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application paradigm as Social Sensing based Edge Computing
(SSEC) [2], [7]–[9].
One key concern in SSEC is privacy where the end users’
private information (e.g., location and device statuses such as
CPU usage and frequency) may be leaked to the server or other
participants of the application. Such privacy concern originates
from the diversified ownership in SSEC system where the
devices are owned by individuals with diverse interests and
affiliations. Therefore it is very difficult to form the mutual
trust among these participants in the system. Furthermore,
it may cause serious consequences by sharing the private
information with the server (e.g., identity theft and information
harvesting should a malicious attacker compromises the server
or the server is malicious by itself) [10].
In light of the unique privacy concern of SSEC, we study a
critical problem of privacy-aware task allocation in the SSEC
system. Our goal is to effectively allocate the computation
tasks in an application to available resource in the system
(e.g., end devices) to meet the Quality of Service (QoS)
requirements of the application (e.g., deadline hit rate, end-
to-end delay) while respecting the privacy constraints from
the end users. Different from existing literature on privacy-
preserving edge computing that assumes uniformed privacy
requirements from all users [10], [11], we assume the privacy
setting is user-dependent, i.e., each individual end user can
have his or her own privacy preference. Compared to the
flat security and privacy protection policy that only enforces
an “on-off” mode, a customized policy would treat users
based on their unique privacy preferences. The key advantage
of such personalized privacy design is that the server can
benefit from device owners who are not paranoid to share their
private information. We argue that such customized design is
practicalas it is well observed that privacy is both context and
user-dependent [12]–[15].
We found the privacy-aware task allocation problem to be
uniquely challenging due to the complex tradeoff between pri-
vacy settings of the end users (i.e., owners of end devices) and
the optimization of task allocation in the system. In particular,
in order to obtain a globally optimal task allocation scheme,
the SSEC system usually needs to collect the location and
status information of all end devices [16]. During this process,
privacy is an important concern in SSEC for multiple reasons.
First, the sensing data collected from end devices are often
privacy sensitive. For example, in a social sensing application
of destruction detection in the aftermath of a disaster [17],
it’s important to associate the sensing report with the accurate
location of the report. However, the reported location could
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2potentially reveal the reporter’s residence information. Second,
both servers and end devices are not fully trusted by one
another in SSEC and may intentionally try to harvest other
users’ private information for either revenue or malicious
intents [18]. Last but not least, a malicious server can leverage
side channels (such as the task preferences of the users [19])
to infer the private information without directly accessing it
from the end users. With the above challenges in mind, we
focus on two important aspects unique to this privacy-aware
task allocation in SSEC systems in this paper: rational end
devices and partial information.
Rational end devices: One unique design of SSEC is to
leverage privately owned end devices at the edge, rather than
merely using dedicated nodes (edge/fog servers such as micro
data centers and cloudlets) to perform sensing and computa-
tional tasks. The owners of these end devices are rational ac-
tors and often have inconsistent or even conflicting objectives
with the application. From the application’s perspective, it is
of its best interest to obtain better knowledge on the status of
each end device to optimize the task allocation performance.
For example, the location information of an end device will
be helpful for the application to decide where to offload the
computation tasks. However, the end devices’ owners may
not be willing to share such information due to their privacy
concerns. This is in sharp contrast to traditional distributed
computing systems where computational resources are fully
cooperative and directly controlled by the application. Several
privacy-preserving schemes have been developed to allow
participants to hide their private information via anonymity
techniques [10], [18], [20]. However, these solutions did not
explicitly consider the performance trade-off between the
application performance and the privacy requirements of the
end users. The rational nature of end devices in SSEC must
be carefully addressed by developing a new task allocation
model that respects the discrepancies between the objectives
of applications and end devices.
Partial Information: The privacy configurations of end de-
vices in SSEC often lead to partial information of the devices
to be shared, which prevents the system from achieving the
optimal task allocation decision. For example, if most of the
end devices in the system are unwilling to reveal their comput-
ing power information (e.g., CPU frequency and CPU usage),
the server will have little knowledge on which end device
is more suitable for executing a computationally intensive
task. The problem becomes more challenging in SSEC system
where end devices (end users) often have different privacy
preferences (e.g., some end users are willing to expose their
location information where others may not), leading to various
degrees of partial information in the task allocation process.
With such incomplete knowledge of the system, not only
the server cannot make optimal decisions, but also the end
devices cannot accurately conjecture the behaviors of other
end devices and decide their own best strategies in obtaining
the computation tasks. This user-defined partial information
challenge is unique in the privacy-aware SSEC system and
cannot be directly solved by current task allocation schemes
that either assume full information disclosure or ignore the
self-controlled privacy level defined by end users.
To address the above challenges, we develop a novel Game-
theoretic Privacy-aware Task Allocation (G-PATA) framework.
To address the rational end devices challenge, we develop
a bottom-up task allocation model based on game theory to
incentivize end devices to pick the tasks that provide them
maximum payoffs. A dynamic reward mechanism is designed
to ensure the QoS of the application is satisfied. To overcome
the partial information challenge, we design a privacy-aware
negotiation process that allows the server and end devices to
jointly make optimal decisions given only limited information
on the status of end devices.
We also implemented a prototype of G-PATA using a
real-world SSEC system that consists of Nvidia Jetson TX1
and TK1 boards, and Raspberry Pi3. We evaluated the per-
formance of G-PATA using two real-world delay-sensitive
social sensing applications: Collaborative Traffic Monitoring
[21] and Abnormal Event Detection [22]. We compared G-
PATA with the state-of-the-art task allocation schemes used
in edge computing systems. The results show that our scheme
achieves a significant performance gain in terms of meeting the
performance objectives of both applications and end devices
under various privacy settings.
II. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK
A. Social Sensing and Edge Computing
Social sensing has received a significant amount of attention
due to the proliferation of low-cost mobile sensors and the
ubiquitous Internet connectivity [35]–[37]. Examples of such
applications include intelligent transportation systems [4], ur-
ban sensing [38], and disaster and emergency response [39].
Traditional social sensing applications push all the computa-
tion tasks to the backend servers, which can be quite ineffec-
tive, especially for time-critical applications, due to the limited
network bandwidth and high communication latency [23]. The
edge computing paradigm complements traditional centralized
social sensing solutions by offloading computation tasks to the
end devices to reduce communication costs and application
latency [40]. We refer to the marriage of social sensing and
edge computing as Social Sensing based Edge Computing
paradigm or SSEC. There is much untapped potential for
highly responsive social sensing applications at the edge. For
example, Zhang et al. proposed a game theoretic bottom-up
task allocation scheme to allow non-cooperative end devices to
perform social sensing tasks by providing them with incentives
[2]. Satyanarayanan et al. introduced an intermediate layer
(i.e., “cloudlet”) located between the cloud and mobile devices
to mitigate latency related issues between end devices and
servers [41]. A major knowledge gap in these schemes is that
they require the end devices to trust the server to manage their
privacy. This trust is often misplaced since even trustworthy
servers can also suffer from a data-breach [10]. In this work,
we propose G-PATA, a framework to efficiently allocate social
sensing tasks that satisfy user-defined privacy requirements.
B. Task Allocation
The allocation of computation tasks is the core problem
in SSEC and many relevant solutions have been proposed in
3Table I: Summary of Existing Related Work Compared to The Proposed Work
Compared Schemes Customized Privacy Rational Edge Incomplete Information Optimize Delay Optimize Energy
Our scheme (G-PATA) X X X X X
Top-down allocation ([23]–[27]) X X
Auction game ([28]–[30]) X X
Congestion game ([2], [31] ) X X X X
Group bidding ([19], [20]) X X
Differential privacy ([32]–[34]) X X X
traditional real-time and distributed systems [23]–[27]. Both
top-down and bottom-up approaches have been developed.
In a top-down approach, a centralized decision maker (often
an algorithm running on the back-end server) makes global
allocation decisions with the assumption that end devices are
fully controlled and cooperative [23], [24]. For example, Zhu
et al. proposed a Mixed Integer Linear Programming based
approach to meet the deadlines and minimize the end-to-end
latency in hard real-time systems [25]. Su et. al developed
a mixed criticality task model to maximize the number of
low-criticality tasks being executed without influencing the
timeliness of high-criticality tasks [26]. Most of the above
schemes depend on the accurate schedulability analysis (e.g.,
estimating the worst-case execution time (WCET) of assigning
a task to a device). Such an approach would fail in privacy-
aware SSEC where the end users might refuse to provide
necessary information to comply with the centralized task
allocation schemes [31], [42]. Due to the limitations of cen-
tralized task allocation schemes, a decentralized approach that
end devices make task allocation decisions by themselves
seem to be a better fit to the privacy-aware SSEC system.
Decentralized decision-making schemes have been developed
in mobile crowdsensing, wireless networks, and multi-agent
systems, where decisions are made autonomously by devices
interacting with each other. For example, Ahmad et al. de-
veloped a game-theoretic approach for scheduling tasks on
multi-core processors to jointly optimize performance and
energy [27]. A few auction game based bottom-up approaches
are also developed for distributing crowdsourcing tasks to the
mobile users [29], [30]. In a more recent work, Zhang et
al. proposed CoGTA, an edge computing system that allows
non-cooperative and heterogeneous end devices to trade tasks
and claim rewards [28]. However, the above solutions did not
address the privacy constraints imposed by end users, thus
cannot be directly applied to our problem.
C. Privacy Preservation
Privacy preservation has always been a key design objective
in edge computing and mobile crowd sensing communities.
Providing anonymity is a key privacy protection technique
that has been applied to many relevant fields such as mobile
crowdsourcing and distributed systems. For example, Al-
Muhtadi et al. developed a protocol called Mist to mask user
locations in ubiquitous computing [43]. Song et al. advocate
the use of VPNs combined with fuzzy logic to promote
privacy in grid computing [44]. A serious limitation of these
techniques is that they prevent the application from identifying
the contributors of the computation tasks [45] and the rewards
can not be sent to the contributing end devices that accomplish
the computation tasks if anonymity techniques are directly
applied in SSEC [10]. To address this challenge, Vance et al.
developed a block-chain based decentralized edge computing
framework that allocates incentives to end devices without
revealing their identity [10]. Li et al. developed a secure-
bidding scheme for bidding tasks among mobile devices while
protecting individual privacy [20].
A set of recent work on customized differential privacy
[32]–[34] in location-based systems (LBS) are also highly
relevant to our work. For example, Andre´s et al. proposed
a geo-indistinguishability differential privacy framework that
allows each individual user to define customized privacy levels
for a particular radius of spatial region [32]. Jorgensen et al.
developed a personalized differential privacy (PDP) technique
that directly generalizes the classical differential privacy to
consider different privacy requirements for different users [34].
While these approaches can also provide user-defined privacy
protection, they suffer from several limitations. First, the dif-
ferential privacy-based approaches focus on the utility-privacy
trade-offs rather than providing strict privacy protection. In
contrast, in this paper, our assumption is that the private
data must be completely indistinguishable and a user will not
sacrifice his/her predefined privacy level by trading it with the
data utility. Another limitation lies in the fact that existing
work have pretty strong assumptions on the granularity of the
privacy setting. For example, most of them are designed to
customize privacy for continuous spatial regions (e.g., charac-
terized by a radius or grids). These assumptions are often not
practical from a usability standpoint in our problem. This is
because people may prefer all types of privacy setting options
such as hierarchical settings (city/state/country), continuous
settings (CPU frequency, memory), or categorical settings
(device is sleep/not). To our knowledge, existing differential
privacy-based approaches do not provide such flexibility on the
privacy settings for users. In contrast, the proposed scheme
addresses this problem by modeling the data accessibility
under privacy constraints by defining a probabilistic density
function over a specific uncertainty region. These functions
are general and can be defined for various types of data.
D. Summary
Finally, we summarize the approaches, advantages, and
disadvantages of the related work in Table I. It is clear that the
proposed G-PATA scheme is the first one to jointly optimize
the competing objectives (energy minimization of the rational
edge and delay minimization at the server) while satisfying
the customized privacy requirements.
4III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present the privacy-aware task allocation
problem for delay-sensitive social sensing applications in edge
computing systems. We first present the task model, assump-
tions, and the privacy model we used, and then formally define
the objectives of our problem. The definitions of the notations
are summarized in Table II.
Table II: Summary of Notations
t The tth sensing cycle, t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}
Ex The xth end device, x ∈ {1, 2, ..., X}
Sy The yth edge server, y ∈ {1, 2, ..., Y }
τm The mth task, m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}
∆ The common deadline of the tasks
DIx,z The zth private information of Ex, z ∈ {1, 2, ..., Z}
DIx,z The privacy requirement for DIx,z
pim,x The cost of Ex for performing τm
Dm The end-to-end delay of τm
qj,i The quality score of end device Ej when performing τi
Ri The reward of a task τi
uj,i The payoff of end device Ej for picking τi
S(j) The edge server assigned to Ej
A. Overview of SSEC Systems
A typical SSEC system has three layers (as shown in Figure
1): end devices, edge servers, and a remote application server.
Let ED = {E1, E2, ..., EX} denote the set of all end devices
in the system. We assume the social sensing application
manages a set of Y edge servers - ES = {S1, S2, ..., SY }.
These edge servers provide local data processing/storage ca-
pabilities and coordinate the connected local end devices in
accomplishing the allocated tasks. We assume each end device
is assigned to one particular edge server and the result of
the computation task finished by an end device should be
offloaded to the assigned edge server for further processing.
The remote application server AS (often built into a remote
data center/cloud) provides a global service interface to all
users of interest to the social sensing applications.
Figure 1: An Overview of The Social Sensing based Edge
Computing System Architecture
B. Task Model in SSEC
In an SSEC system, end devices not only collect sensing
data but also contribute significantly to social sensing com-
putation tasks. A social sensing computation task processes
the raw sensing data using the algorithm assigned by the
application. These tasks can be for data preprocessing to
compress the raw sensing data or for feature extraction to
extract and provide useful features.
We adopt a frame-based task model [46] commonly used
in the real-time system community where computation tasks
are periodically initialized and all tasks have the same pe-
riod and deadline. We use ∆ to denote the common dead-
line of all the tasks in an application. ∆ captures the
user desired QoS in terms of when the tasks should be
finished. For a given application at the tth sensing cycle
(i.e., period), we assume that a total of M tasks are to
be processed, i.e., Tasks = {τ1(t), τ2(t), ..., τM (t)}. Each
computation task is associated with a 4-tuple: τm(t) =
{V Im(t), V Om(t), algm(t), typem(t)} where V Im is the data
volume to be processed by task τm(t), and V Om(t) is the
expected size of the output. algm(t) and typem(t) denotes
the algorithm to process the input sensing data and the data
type of the data (i.e., text, image, video). For example, a social
sensing application can task a set of vehicles to collect and
process the data related to road conditions (e.g., video data
using dash cameras).
C. Privacy and Threat Models
To capture the privacy concerns of end users in SSEC, we
assume that the application defines a set of Z categories of
private device information: {DIx,1, DIx,2, ...DIx,Z}, where
DIx,z denotes the zth private information item of device Ex.
An example of DIx would be (location: 5th Ave, NYC, USA;
CPU frequency: 2.4 GHz: CPU usage: 50%).
We assume end users may have different privacy require-
ments for their private information. The privacy requirements
are set up by end users when they first commit to the social
sensing application (e.g., by installing a client software) and
can be dynamically adjusted during the whole period of the
application. For example, some users are willing to disclose
the street address of their locations while others may only
be willing to disclose which city they are in. For every end
device Ex, we define its privacy requirement at the tth sensing
cycle as {DIx,1(t), DIx,2(t), ..., DIx,Z(t)} where DIx,z(t)
denotes the privacy requirement for DIx,z at the tth sensing
cycle. We illustrate an example of self-defined privacy require-
ments in Figure 2. In this example, each device has its own
privacy requirement. For a particular category of information,
some end devices can be very conservative (e.g., only reveal
the current CPU frequency with a high uncertainty range such
as 1-3 GHz, or even disclose nothing, as denoted as “?” in
the figure) while other devices can be very “generous” by
sharing the exact CPU frequency information such as 2.5 GHz.
The privacy-aware task allocation problem is to study how to
perform optimal task-device mapping given such diversified
privacy requirements.
We adopt a threat model where the adversaries are honest-
but-curious, which is a commonly used threat model for
crowdsourcing and edge computing related applications [20],
[47]–[49]. Under such an assumption, the end users, edge
servers, as well as the application server will follow the
application protocol truthfully without cheating but they are
interested in inferring the private status and location of other
5Figure 2: Privacy-aware Task allocation Problem
end devices. We then define the privacy requirement violation
as follows:
DEFINITION 1. Privacy Requirement Violation: the privacy
requirement of an end device (end user) is violated when the
server or any other end devices have access to more private
information than the user is willing to disclose.
To ensure privacy requirement violation, merely preventing
the server or other devices from having direct access to
the private information of an end user is not enough. We
note that side-channel attacks can obtain a certain amount of
private information even the users do not directly disclose
such information [20]. For example, in a task allocation
framework, if an end device always prefers a task with high
computational complexity, then the end device may likely have
high computation power (e.g., low CPU usage and high CPU
frequency) [30]. Considering such side-channel based privacy
violation, we also define the decision privacy as follows:
DEFINITION 2. Decision Privacy: the task allocation deci-
sion of each individual end device should not be exposed to
other end devices.
Note that we only protect decision privacy among end
devices. The reason is that the server has to know the de-
cisions made by end devices to assign tasks and rewards. In
such a context, achieving decision privacy is still particularly
challenging in bottom-up approaches, which we elaborate in
Section IV.
We also note that potential information leakage can happen
if a malicious server carefully examines the raw sensing data
provided by the end devices. One potential attack is via
correlated data, where the server can examine the similar-
ity of the data provided by two devices, and infer private
information if one device provides more information than
the other. Consider a simple example where two devices are
reporting air quality index of their current region. Device A
is willing to provide full location information to the server
while Device B only discloses the current city. The server
can then guess the full location of Device B if it reports the
exact same air quality index as Device A. Another potential
attack is directly extracting private information from the raw
data. For example, consider a social sensing application that
leverages drones/vehicles to monitor the road conditions using
onboard cameras. It is possible to have human faces, car
plate numbers, or location identifiers (e.g., street names) in
the reported images. This work does not focus on the above
privacy leakages related to the raw sensing data. We discuss
how our framework can be extended to address this issue in
Section VII.
D. Reward and Cost Model
An appropriate reward mechanism is essential to facilitate
compliance in SSEC where end devices are not owned by
the application. In order to motivate end devices to perform
computation tasks, it is often necessary to provide rewards
(either monetary or non-monetary) to end users to incentivize
their participation in computation tasks and compensate for
their costs (e.g., energy) to finish the tasks [50]. We define a
few terms below.
DEFINITION 3. Edge Cost pim,x: we use energy cost to
represent the cost that end devices have to pay in completing
computation tasks.
pim,x = Powerx · cm,x (1)
Powerx is the average power consumption of end device Ex
and is calculated by
Powerx = Powercomp,x + Powertrans,x (2)
where Powercomp is the power consumption for computation,
and Powertrans is the power consumption for data transmis-
sion via wireless network and is proportional to the data size
been transferred.
DEFINITION 4. Task Rewards: we assume that the server
has a fixed budget for a social sensing application. The server
needs to compensate for the end devices’ contributions by
providing a monetary or non-monetary reward for completing
each task (e.g., virtual currency, virtual credit).
DEFINITION 5. Edge Payoff ux(t): we use ux(t) to denote
the overall benefit that end device Ex receives by executing
tasks at the tth sensing cycle. It defines the individual gain (as
a function of of cost and reward) of an end device and more
details are given in Section IV.
E. Problem Statement
The goal of our problem is to identify an optimized task
allocation scheme to best meet the objectives of the end
devices and the application without violating the privacy
requirements of end users. The objective of the end devices is
to maximize their payoffs, ux(t), defined in DEFINITION 5.
To formulate the application objective, we first define a key
term end-to-end delay as:
DEFINITION 6. End-to-end delay of task(Dm(t)): the total
amount of time taken for the sensing data to be processed by
τm(t) and transferred to the local edge server.
Then we use a binary variable δm(t) to represent whether
a task misses a deadline or not:
δm(t) =
{
1, Dm(t) > ∆ (deadline miss)
0, otherwise (deadline hit)
(3)
6We formally define the application objective as minimizing
the deadline miss rate of all tasks.
Given the above definitions, assumptions and system mod-
els, our privacy-aware task allocation problem is a multi-
objective constrained optimization problem:
maximize ux(t),∀1 ≤ x ≤ X, 1 ≤ t ≤ T
(end device/end user objective)
minimize
M∑
m=1
δm(t),∀1 ≤ m ≤M, 1 ≤ t ≤ T
(application objective)
s.t.: DIx(t)is satisfied,∀1 ≤ x ≤ X, 1 ≤ t ≤ T
(privacy constraints)
(4)
Note that the task allocation problem for heterogeneous
distributed systems is in general NP-hard [25], [51]. The
problem becomes more challenging in this multi-objective
formulation where the objectives of the application and end
devices are potentially conflicting and additional privacy con-
straints are imposed. In the next section, we discuss our G-
PATA framework to solve this problem.
IV. A GAME-THEORETIC PRIVACY-AWARE TASK
ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK
In this section, we develop a Game-theoretic Privacy-aware
Task Allocation (G-PATA) framework to address the privacy-
aware task allocation problem defined in Section III.
A. System Overview and Workflow
An overview of G-PATA framework is given in Figure 3.
The G-PATA framework consists of four major components: (i)
an Incentive-driven Task Allocation Game (ITAG) that models
the cost and benefits of each task allocation strategy for the
end devices; (ii) a Decentralized Privacy-aware Fictitious Play
(DPFP) scheme that aims at maximizing the individual payoffs
of end devices while respecting the privacy requirements of the
end users; (iii) a Dynamic Reward Assignment (DRA) scheme
that dynamically tunes the rewards to ensure the QoS of the
application; and (iv) an Uncertainty-aware Load Balancing
(ULB) scheme that efficiently assigns end devices to edge
servers to make the system adaptive to the dynamics of the
end devices. We present these components in detail below.
B. An Incentive-driven Task Allocation Game
The task allocation problem can be modeled as an bottom-
up Incentive-driven Task Allocation Game (ITAG) where the
end devices, rather than the server, decide their preferred tasks
to selfishly maximize their individual payoffs. The rationale of
adopting a bottom-up game-theoretic approach is mainly three-
fold: 1) the server has only a limited amount of information of
the end devices to make the globally optimal task allocation
decisions; 2) the game theory approach allows the end devices
to collectively achieve maximum payoffs for themselves, thus
facilitating the compliance of the end users; 3) the bottom-up
approach eliminates the necessity of sharing private informa-
tion to the server for decision making, which provides the
foundation for achieving privacy-awareness in SSEC.
Figure 3: Overview of G-PATA
1) Game Setup: We first describe how the ITAG is set up.
Recall that in SSEC, we have a total of X end devices, M tasks
and Y edge servers as described in Section III. The ITAG is
played with a local cluster of end devices – an edge server
and the end devices connected to it. We discuss how the local
cluster is formed in Section IV-E.
An ITAG can be described by a tuple
(Sy, EDy, TK,A,Ψ, pi,R) where Sy ∈ ES is the local
game host (i.e., an edge server) and EDy ∈ ED is a
set of J players (end devices that are assigned to Sy)
{Ey,j |1 ≤ j ≤ J,Ey,j ∈ ED}, where 1 ≤ J ≤ X .1 TK is a
set of I computation tasks {τi|1 ≤ i ≤ I, τi ∈ Tasks} where
1 ≤ I ≤ M . In each sensing cycle, we define a Strategy
Profile A as a set of individual task allocation strategies,
i.e. A = {a1, a2, ..., aJ} ∈ Ψ, where aj denotes the task
strategy (i.e., which tasks to execute) on the end device Ej .
For example, if a local edge server is connected by 2 end
devices and there are a total of 4 tasks. end device 1 picks
task 1 and 3 while end device 2 picks task 2 and 4. Then
we have a1 = {1, 3} and a2 = {2, 4}. We use Ψ to denote
the computation task allocation strategy space for all players:
Ψ = Ψ1 × Ψ2 × ... × ΨJ where Ψj represents the strategy
space of player Ej (i.e., 2I possible task allocation strategies
for each device). pi represents a device-specific cost function
vector pi = {pi1, pi2, .., piJ} for all end devices where the
element pij represents the cost of the end device Ej to execute
the allocated tasks based on strategy aj . R = {R1, R2..., RI}
is a set of rewards that is provided by the application where
Ri represents the reward for executing task τi. We further
define a payoff function for a task allocation strategy aj as a
function g(·):
uj = g(R, pij , aj , a−j). (5)
Here a−j represents the strategies for other end devices. The
payoff function represents how much benefits the end device
Ej can gain if strategy aj is taken by Ej . The objective of
Ej is to pick the best task allocation strategy that maximizes
1We omit the index for sensing cycle (i.e. t) and index for edge server
(i.e., y) for ease of notation in the rest of the section.
7its own payoff function, given the strategies picked by other
end devices:
argmax
aj
g(R, pij , aj , a−j) (6)
2) Game Protocol: The high-level game protocols of every
ITAG at each sensing cycle is designed as follows: (i) the
edge server broadcasts the tasks and the reward for each task
to the end devices at the beginning of every sensing cycle; (ii)
each end device simultaneously picks a task that has the best
payoff for itself; (iii) if multiple nodes choose the same task,
the server performs a tie breaking process to assign a task to
a specific device. We refer to one round of this task allocation
process as an “iteration”, and assume that each end device is
myopic and only picks one task at a time (singleton property)
within each iteration; (iv) keep iterating until all tasks are
picked. After all the tasks are assigned, the end devices start
to process the tasks they picked.
The game protocol described above has two key properties:
1) congestion property - the expected reward of each task
monotonically decreases as the number of end devices that
pick the task increases; 2) singleton property - each player
can only pick one task at a time. The key benefit of these two
properties is the guaranteed existence of Nash Equilibrium
[52] which is crucial for the end devices to make mutually
satisfactory task allocation decisions. The singleton property
reduces the strategy space O(2I) to O(I) for each iteration
which significantly reduces the task allocation overhead.
3) Tie Breaking Process and Payoff: In real-world scenario,
the amount of end devices is enormous and it is very likely that
multiple nodes choose the same task. The tie breaking process
described in the game protocol is a critical component in
ITAG. It allows the edge server to decide which end device to
execute the task that yields the best system performance when
multiple devices are competing for the same task. However,
picking the best assignee is challenging because the edge
server can only observe partial information from the end
devices due to privacy constraints. For example, if two devices
are competing for the same task, it is best to assign the task to
the device with better computing power (to reduce execution
delay) or closer distance (to reduce network delay). But it is
likely that neither device is willing to share their computing
power or location. To perform tie-breaking, we first design a
mechanism to determine the quality of each end device. We
formally define the quality of an end device as:
DEFINITION 7. Quality of end device qi,j : a score metric
denotes how efficient an end device Ei can finish a task τj .
The efficiency is measured in terms of computing power and
transmission delay. The higher computing power and lower
transmission delay a device has, the higher the quality score
should be.
Note that in the above definition, the quality score also
depends on which task is assigned to the device. This is
because the transmission delay and computing power have
to be evaluated in the context of which task it is going to
execute. An end device has different computing capabilities
and transmission delays for different tasks.
The server derives a quality score qj,i for each device as:
qj,i = λ1 · f̂j · (1− ûj)− λ2 · ̂dist(Ej , S(j)). (7)
where f̂j and ûj denotes the estimated CPU frequency and
usage for Ej . ̂dist(Ej , S(j)) denotes the estimated distance
from Ej and the assigned edge server S(j). λ1, λ2 are tunable
parameters.
Then, to perform tie breaking, the server randomly assigns
the task τi to Ej with probability
qj,i∑
j′∈D(i)
qj′,i
(8)
where D(i) denotes the set of devices that pick τi. The
intuition is that end devices with shorter distances to the
edge server (lower latency) and higher computation power
is preferred. The tie breaking strategy based on Equation (8)
allows computationally inferior end devices to refrain from
taking tasks with high rewards (i.e., computationally expensive
tasks).
We now show how the server estimates the status infor-
mation, (i.e., CPU frequency and distance) of end devices
given the partial information shared by the end device. First,
we model the partial device information as a probability
density function (PDF) over a specific uncertainty region
UR = [LB,UB]. This is a classical technique for modeling
uncertain data [53]. For CPU frequency and usage information,
the uncertain region is the frequency/utilization range that a
user shares to the application. For example, assume an end
device discloses its CPU frequency as 1-3 GHz and CPU
usage as 50% - 100%, then the uncertainty regions are [1,3]
and [50%, 100%], respectively. The PDF is a distribution
over the region. For example, the server can assume a PDF
as a uniform distribution which means the server can only
randomly guess the actual CPU frequency and its usage in the
corresponding range. For location information, the uncertainty
bound is a geographical region that a user is willing to
share. For example, if an end device discloses its location
as State A, then the geographical region of State A is the
uncertainty bound. The PDF can be estimated based on the
prior knowledge of the region. For example, the PDF can be
assumed to be the population distribution (intuitively, the end
device has a higher chance to locate in an area with higher
population density) over State A.
Based on the above model for uncertain information, the
server can estimate the end device’s status using one of two
methods. The first method is anchor point based estimation
approach [54]. In this method, the edge server first samples
a total of K values from PDF within the uncertainty bound
(referred to as anchor points) and then estimates the device
status and location of end devices based on the average of the
sampled K anchor points. The second method is a conservative
information estimation approach. In this approach, the edge
server estimates the CPU frequency, CPU usage, and location
of end devices based on the worst-case estimate [55]. To be
specific, for location, we assume the end device has the fur-
thest distance within UR to the edge server. For CPU operating
frequency and usage, we assume it has the lowest frequency
8and highest usage within UR. In this paper, we pick the
conservative information estimation to run on the edge servers
because 1) the anchor point based estimation may encourage
lower-end end devices to hide their private information and
keep themselves from being selected for the task allocation;
2) conservative information estimation encourages end devices
to trade their privacy for more incentives. For example, if an
end device A has a frequency of 1 GHz while the other devices
are powerful and have an average frequency of 2.5 GHz. When
the server uses anchor point based evaluation, device A will
not be able to compete for tasks if it reports the exact device
frequency. Instead, device A will be tempting to report a vague
range such as [0, 10] GHz to trick the system to better compete
for rewards. Conservative information estimation solves this
problem by adopting the worst-case estimation so that device
A has no incentives to report a vague range rather than the
actual frequency.
After introducing the ITAG game protocol and tie breaking
process, we can now define the key component in the bottom-
up task allocation process - the payoff function. Let’s assume
the device Ej picks the ith task in an iteration. We can define
the individual payoff function of Ej as:
uj,i =

Ri · qj,i
ej,i ·
j′∈D(i)∑
qj′,i
,
cji
∆
+ ûj ≤ 1
0,
cji
∆
+ ûj > 1
(9)
where uj,i is the payoff function of Ej if it picks edge task
τi in the current iteration. ej,i is the energy cost of the ith
task of end device Ej . Note that more comprehensive cost
functions can be easily plugged in into this framework. cji is
the estimated WCET of τi. ûj captures the total utilization of
all the tasks currently assigned to Ej . We assume that earliest
deadline first (EDF) scheduling algorithm is used at Ej . With
EDF, task would miss its deadline if c
j
i
∆ + ûj > 1. In the above
payoff function, we discourage the end devices to pick tasks
that they could not finish before the deadline by providing no
reward for those tasks.
To ensure that each end device makes its best decision
towards maximizing the above payoff, our goal is to find a
Nash Equilibrium for the ITAG. The Nash Equilibrium exists
in a non-cooperative game where each player (i.e., end device
in our model) has nothing to gain by only changing his/her
own strategy. In the next subsection, we describe how to find
the Nash Equilibrium in ITAG in a decentralized and privacy-
aware fashion.
Note that the payoff function (in Equation (9)) of an end
device depends on the aggregated quality scores of other end
devices (i.e.,
j′∈D(i)∑
qj′,i) without the necessity of understand-
ing the exact payoffs of other end devices. This is an important
property we used for designing a privacy-aware fictitious play
algorithm discussed below.
C. Decentralized Privacy-aware Fictitious Play
In this subsection, we develop a Decentralized Privacy-
aware Fictitious Play (DPFP) solution for SSEC that finds the
Nash Equilibrium in an iterative fashion. The design objective
of the DPFP is 3-fold: 1) no information other than that
willingly shared by the end devices is used to perform task
allocation; 2) the decision privacy must be ensured such that
no individual device’s strategy is disclosed; 3) the algorithm
can efficiently adapt to time-critical social sensing application
with constantly changing device status.
Classical Nash Equilibrium (NE) solutions, such as best
response dynamics, reinforcement learning, or Fictitious
Play [56] cannot be applied to the ITAG model. This is because
each end device has only partial information of other end
devices due to the privacy constraints, thus cannot precisely
derive other devices’ best strategies to make its own best
decision (similar as in an auction scenario where each bidder
would not share her own valuation of an item beforehand).
Moreover, these algorithms require all end devices to share
their exact strategies in the game, which violates the decision
privacy defined in Section III.
Our solution develops a Joint-Strategy Best Response Dy-
namics scheme where each end device predicts the aggregated
“congestion rate” of a computation task instead of the actual
individual strategy (i.e., the task being picked) of an end
device. Therefore, an end device only observes the number of
devices that plan to pick a specific task rather than the actual
strategy of other devices. Our scheme enables an obfuscation
via the grouping of the strategies from end devices, ensuring
decision privacy.
Specifically, at each iteration of ITAG, each end device
first estimates a congestion rate as Ni =
∑̂
j′∈D(i)
qj,i. The
congestion rate is the estimation of the overall quality score
of all devices that may pick τi in the next sensing cycle. The
congestion rate is dynamically estimated as:
Ni = µ · N previ + (1− µ) ·
∑
j′∈D(i)
qj,i (10)
where µ ∈ (0, 1] is a decay factor that controls the importance
of more recent observations.N previ is the estimated congestion
rate in the previous sensing cycle and
∑
j′∈D(i)
qj,i is the actual
congestion rate of τi in the current sensing cycle, which is
synchronized to the end devices from the edge server.
Then, based on the estimation, each end device finds the
best response given the estimated congestion rates. Intuitively,
if a task is predicted to be too “congested”, the end device
may want to avoid picking that task (even the task has a high
reward), and resort to picking less congested ones. The best
response is derived as:
a∗j =
 arg maxi
Ri · qj,i
ej,i · Ni , with probability ρ
aprevj , with probability 1− ρ
(11)
where aprevj denotes the strategy of Ej in the previous
iteration. ρ is an “inertia term” that allows the end devices
to be “lazy” at certain rounds of the game (i.e., the end device
do not need to update their strategy at every iteration) so the
communication overhead can be significantly reduced.
The ITAG continues the above process until a convergence
signal is found - i.e., the server found no end device would
9change its strategy in two consecutive iterations. Then ITAG
concludes a Nash Equilibrium is found. We refer the proof
of convergence of FP with inertia and the existence of Nash
Equilibrium in [57].
One key limitation of FP-based solutions is the slow con-
vergence rate, which would result in significant performance
degradation, thus seriously impact the QoS of real-time sys-
tems [2]. To further improve the efficiency of the DPFP
algorithm, we set an upper bound on the number of iterations.
We refer to this modification as P-chance Negotiation where
each end device has a maximum number of P times to regret
and re-adjust their strategy. Note that when P=1, the scheme
degenerates to a sealed bidding game [58] where each end
device can only negotiate once. We summarize the DPFP
algorithm in Algorithm 1. We also illustrate a toy run of two
devices competing for 2 tasks in Figure 4.
Algorithm 1 Decentralized Privacy-aware Fictitious Play
Input: TK, R, I , J , ∆, P
Output: task allocation Strategy for Ej
1: Initialize: taskCount ← newArray[J ][I], A ← newArray[J ],
converge← False
2: Predict congestion rate of all tasks based on Equation (10) . Congestion
Rate Estimation
3: while converge 6= True or iterCount ≤ P do
4: iterCount← iterCount+ 1
5: find h← optimal strategy for Ej based on Equation (11) . Best
Response
6: send h to server, receive congestion rate of all tasks, convergence
signal sig
7: converge← sig
8: update congestion rate prediction based on Equation (10)
9: end while
10: Return A[j]
D. Dynamic Reward Assignment
The ITAG and DPFP approaches discussed above ensure
that the end devices achieve maximum payoff through non-
cooperative gameplay. As shown in the payoff functions
(Equation (9)), the definition of the rewards plays a critical
role with respect to whether a computation task is picked by
end devices for execution. Due to the dynamic compliance
issues, (i.e., the fact that the cost of end devices and their
willingness to execute tasks can change over time), static
reward functions are generally not optimal for the server to
satisfy QoS requirements [2]. We introduce a Dynamic Reward
Assignment (DRA) scheme for the server to dynamically
update task rewards in order to meet the QoS objective of
the application. Below, we first present the general reward
function and then discuss how it is dynamically adjusted.
The DRA performs a 2-step control process: 1) DRA
dynamically decides reward distribution among tasks; 2) DRA
dynamically adjusts the overall budget for the next sensing
cycle based on the performance feedback.
Given the budget, the server calculates the reward of a task
τi based on the computational complexity and transmission
complexity to be processed:
Ri =
α1
α1 + α2
·Oci +
α2
α1 + α2
·Oti (12)
where Oci and O
t
i denotes the expected computation and
communication complexity respectively. α1 and α2 are the
weighting factors. The task rewards are normalized so that
the reward of each individual task is bounded. The design
of the task reward function is intuitive: higher computational
complexity results in higher energy consumption on the end
device, thus should be compensated for higher rewards; same
intuition for transmission complexity.
After the tasks are executed, the server can calculate the
control signals based on which tasks missed the deadlines
and adjust the weights accordingly using a exponential weight
update rule [59]:
αnewk = α
old
k ∗ e−ηLk , k = 1 or 2. (13)
where η is a learning parameter, Lk is a loss function for αk:
L1 =
∑I
i=1O
t
i ∗ δi∑I
i=1 δi
−
∑I
i=1O
t
i ∗ (1− δi)∑I
i=1(1− δi)
,
I∑
i=1
δi 6= 0 or I
L2 =
∑I
i=1O
c
i ∗ δi∑I
i=1 δi
−
∑I
i=1O
c
i ∗ (1− δi)∑I
i=1(1− δi)
,
I∑
i=1
δi 6= 0 or I
(14)
where δi signifies whether task τi misses the deadline or
not (see Section III). In the above equation, we use the
average transmission complexity Oti of the tasks that meet
the deadlines (i.e.,
∑I
i=1 O
t
i∗(1−δi)∑I
i=1(1−δz)
) as a set point and compare
it with the average transmission overhead of the tasks that
missed the deadlines (
∑I
i=1 O
t
z∗δi∑I
i=1 δi
). The same idea applies for
the computation factor (using computation overhead Oci ). The
parameters α1 and α2 are tuned to minimize the loss functions.
The DRA then adjust the overall budget via a simple
feedback control:
budgetnew =

budgetold · β,
I∑
i=1
δi ≥ threshigh
budgetold,
I∑
i=1
δi < threshigh
(15)
In the rare case where all jobs miss their deadlines (i.e.,∑Z
z=1 δz = Z), we resort to admission control and decrease
the number of assigned jobs. Due to the page limit, we omit
the detailed discussions.
E. Efficient Load Balancing with Uncertainty-awareness
We further propose a load-balancing design for G-PATA
where the end devices are assigned to multiple edge servers.
We refer to the edge server and the end devices connected to
it as a “local group”. The assignment of an end device to an
edge server is referred to as an “edge-server” assignment. By
deploying more edge servers, the end devices in SSEC can be
split into multiple local groups with manageable sizes.
The above load balancing design is particularly necessary
for the G-PATA due to the scalability requirement. In par-
ticular, we found the complexity of the ITAG model in G-
PATA largely depends on the number of end devices that
participate in the task bidding process. Therefore, a potential
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Workflow - 1© The edge server first assigns tasks and their associated rewards to the end devices. 2© The end devices calculate
the payoff function of each task. 3© Both end devices believe Task 1 yields the highest payoff of 6, causing them to compete
for Task 1. 4© The edge server observes the devices’ choices, calculates a quality score based on the uncertain information
(due to privacy protection) of the device. Device B is assigned a higher score as it provides more information to determine
its CPU power and distance. 5© The edge server updates a congestion rate for each task, representing the total quality scores
of the devices that pick the task. 6© Each end device updates its payoffs after observing the congestion rate. Device A finds
that its quality score is relatively low as compared to the congestion rate (overall quality score) of Task 1, thus discounting
the payoff for Task 1. 7© After the payoff being recalculated, Device A gives up on Task 1 and picks up Task 2 instead. The
algorithm converges with no contention.
Figure 4: Illustrative Example of ITAG
scalability issue rises: as the number of participating devices
increases, the overhead (including both execution time and
the communication overhead between the end devices and the
edge server during the negotiation process in DPFP) of the
task allocation process becomes excessive. To allow the G-
PATA framework to be scalable, we design a load balancing
module where the “load” refers to the overhead incurred
by the task allocation process (i.e., ITAG model). The load
balancing module can judiciously assign end devices to the
corresponding edge servers to split the load of executing the
task allocation model (i.e., ITAG). Each edge server plays the
ITAG with the end devices that are assigned to it.
Note that a naive load balancing design such as assigning
end devices to the nearest edge servers will not work as users
and servers are usually distributed unevenly within a network,
thus resulting in severe unbalanced load. Additionally, the load
balancing should take into account the privacy requirement
of the SSEC system. In particular, the location of the end
devices are uncertain, thus it is hard to precisely identify the
nearest edge server for an end device. We develop a simple and
effective Uncertainty-aware Load Balancing (ULB) module
that can effectively balance the load of end devices without
violating the privacy constraints of the end devices. For end
device Ex, the goal is to find its assigned edge server Sy,x
that satisfies:
arg min
y
N∑
x=1
ExpD(Ex, Sy,x) =
N∑
x=1
(
∫
fx(r)d(Ex, Sy,x)dr)
(16)
where ExpD is the expected distance function based on a
distance metric d(·). fx(r) denotes the probability density at
r ∈ UR. In this work, we define the distance metric d(·) as:
d(Ex, Sy,x) =
̂dist(Ex, Sy,x)
f̂j · (1− ûj)
(17)
Note that finding the optimal edge-server assignment by
solving Equation (16) is an NP-hard problem [60]. To en-
sure the efficiency of the ULB module, we devise a greedy
algorithm. In particular, given the distance metric, each edge
server picks an end device with the minimum distance in a
round robin fashion. The intuition of the above distance metric
is that each edge server greedily picks the end devices that
have the least estimated delay and highest computing power.
ULB adopts the round-robin strategy to ensure the number
of end devices within each local group is similar so that the
allocation processes (i.e., running the DPFP algorithm) have
similar expected execution time. For each edge server, it needs
to evaluate all the end devices and identify the best fit through
sorting based on Equation (16). To ensure the server will not
pick the same device, each server deletes an end device in the
sorted list once the device has been picked by another server.
The complexity is O(XlogX) for sorting and O(X) for deleting
the device selected by other devices. The overall computational
complexity of ULB module is O(XlogX + XY) where X is the
number of end devices and Y is the number of edge servers
(see Section III).
F. Privacy Analysis of G-PATA
Finally, we discuss the privacy property of G-PATA. The
G-PATA strictly protects user-defined privacy by adopting an
access control mechanism where only the data approved by
the user is disclosed to the server. This prevents unauthorized
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information from being disclosed in the first place (e.g., if a
user chooses to reveal only the “city” information, then the
raw location data is pre-processed so that all entities in the
system can only know the location of the device at the city
level ). The willingly disclosed information is then coded as
an uncertainty region (e.g., the whole region of the city or
the range of frequency of the CPU) via a cloaking method.
Therefore, from the perspective of the servers as well as other
end devices, only the uncertainty region is disclosed and they
cannot possibly know the exact value within the uncertainty
region [61], [62].
V. IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the hardware setup used in our exper-
iments and our implementation of the G-PATA framework.
A. Hardware Setup
We set up a VM cluster as the remote application server
on Amazon AWS by using EC2. It contains four c4.xlarge
EC2 instances with each instance having four cores and 7.5
GB RAM. We use three PC workstations with Intel E5-2600
V4 processor and 16GB of DDR4 memory as the local edge
servers. The edge servers coordinate end devices for the DPFP
algorithm. Figure 5 shows the hardware platform for the end
devices. The platform consists of 15 end devices: 2 Jetson TX1
and 3 Jetson TK1 boards from Nvidia, and 10 Raspberry Pi3
Model B boards. These end devices have heterogeneous energy
profiles and computation capabilities. The Jetson boards are
commonly used in portable computers, UAVs, and autonomous
vehicles and represent high-end end devices [2]. On the other
hand, the Pi3 boards represent lower-end devices that are very
commonly used as IoT testbeds with limited computing power
[63]. All devices and the edge server are connected via a
wireless router.
Figure 5: SSEC Platform
B. Energy Measurement
Energy data are needed in our system. We use FLUKE
AC/DC current clamps to monitor real-time current signal of
each end device and capture the current values using a National
Instruments USB-6216 Data Acquisition (DAQ) system. We
then multiply the current values with the default voltage (12
V for TK1, 19 V for TX1 and 5 V for Pi3) to obtain the power
consumption by each end device.
C. System Modules and Protocol
We further describe the software implementation of the
proposed G-PATA scheme below.
Remote Server Module: The remote server module runs
on the remote application server. It has a main program that
provides a global interface to the developer. In particular, it al-
lows the user to set the overall budget, the system parameters,
and monitors the status of each edge server.
Edge Server Module: The edge server module runs on
each edge server. It consists of a server main program, a load
balancing program and a DPFP server program. The server
main program performs the following tasks: i) periodically
defines a set of tasks where each task specifies what data
to collect and which algorithm to use for data processing;
ii) runs DRA module to adjust rewards for each task; iii)
sends task information to end devices via TCP sockets; iv)
receive outputs from the end devices and aggregate the results.
The load balancing program performs the ULB algorithm to
dynamically decide which edge server an end device should be
assigned to at each sensing cycle. The DPFP server program
coordinates the end devices in the negotiation phase of DPFP
by informing the end devices of the current congestion rate of
each task.
Edge Modules: On each end device, we develop three mod-
ules under the G-PATA framework: the edge main program,
the DPFP client program, and the edge task executable. The
edge main program performs the following tasks: i) receive
periodic edge task information from the server; ii) run the
DPFP client program to select the tasks it picks to execute;
iii) execute edge task executable and send results back to the
server. The DPFP client program calculates the payoff function
for each end device and picks the tasks that give the highest
payoff through the DPFP algorithm. The edge task executable
is a standalone executable file that executes the task assigned
to the end device and generates the results.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the G-PATA scheme using the
SSEC system described in Section V. We first discuss the base-
lines for comparison and then present the evaluation results
using two real-world social sensing applications: Collaborative
Traffic Monitoring and Abnormal Event Detection.
A. Baselines
We choose the following representative task allocation
schemes from recent literature as baselines.
Bottom-Up Game-theoretic Task Allocation (BGTA): A
recent game-theoretic edge computing task allocation scheme
for non-cooperative end devices. It uses a simple distributed
Fictitious Play algorithm for Nash Equilibrium solution [2].
Congestion (COG): A decentralized edge computing task
allocation scheme using congestion game theory where the
reward of a task is monotonically decreasing as more end
devices claiming that task [30].
Greedy-Max Reward (GMXR): A greedy task allocation
scheme where an end device greedily picks the tasks with the
highest reward.
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Table III: Customized Privacy Levels
Privacy Levels 0 1 2 3
Location Exact Location Disclose Street Disclose City Hidden
CPU Frequency Exact CPU Frequency Intervals (resolution of 0.5) Intervals (resolution of 2) Hidden
CPU Usage Exact CPU Usage Intervals (resolution of 20%) Intervals (resolution of 50%) Hidden
Top-Down Allocation (TDA): A top-down task allocation
scheme using MILP with the objective to minimize deadline
miss rate [25]. The solver is running on the server. The server
uses worst-case estimates of the device status based on the
private information shared by end devices.
In the above baselines, BGTA, GMXR, and COG schemes
are similar game-theoretic frameworks that are completely
decentralized in the sense that the servers (both remote ap-
plication server and local edge servers) have no access to any
of the devices’ information, therefore the private information
of end devices is strictly preserved. In contrast, the G-PATA
scheme only protects the private information that the users
are unwilling to share. Also, these decentralized algorithms
require the sharing of each device’s task assignment which
violates the decision privacy define in Section III. For com-
parison purpose, we intentionally allow such violation for two
reasons: 1) we could not find relevant baselines that explicitly
address such decision privacy problem and without sharing
task assignment, the above baselines will not be able to run
properly; 2) by comparing with these baselines, we can study
whether the proposed scheme’s performance will be affected
by the introduction of decision privacy.
B. Evaluation Setup
We further describe the experiment setup details.
1) Location and Communication Setup: To emulate the
locations of the end devices, we use the location distribution
from a Foursquare dataset collected in [64]. From the dataset,
we randomly chose three cities to emulate the sensing area
of interest, where each city has a local edge server deployed.
For each city, we randomly pick 5 streets, and 5 locations
(i.e., point of interest (POI)) for each street. In the following
experiments, we randomly assign end devices to the selected
locations. Given the distance of the devices and servers, as
well as the topology of the network of the SSEC system,
we emulate communication delay using a NS3-based edge
computing network emulator [65].
2) Privacy Level Setting: Our work is based on the as-
sumption that the end users are allowed to set their own
privacy preferences. To empirically evaluate how well the
proposed scheme performs under different privacy settings,
we defined 4 levels of privacy requirements. Each privacy
level is associated with different resolutions of privacy from
the fine-grained resolution (i.e., less privacy protection) such
as exact location and CPU frequency to the coarse-grained
resolution (i.e., more privacy protection) such as a range of
possible CPU frequencies and locations. The privacy level
settings are summarized in Table III. For example, if the CPU
frequency is set as a privacy level of 1, then we define a set
of ranges (0-0.5], (0.5-1],..., (4.5-5]. The user only needs to
disclose the corresponding range of its actual CPU frequency.
Similarly, an end device discloses the CPU usage as one of the
ranges (0%, 20%], (20%, 40%],..,(80%, 100%] under the same
privacy setting. For the location, the user can either choose to
disclose the exact location or only disclose the street or city
of the current location for obfuscation.
C. Case Study 1: Collaborative Traffic Monitoring
In this application, a set of drivers are tasked to use their
dash cameras or smartphones to take videos of the traffic in
front of their vehicles and extract relevant image features.
These features can be then sent to nearby edge servers (e.g.,
Road-Side-Units) to further calculate the congestion rate of
the road. In our experiment, we collected the video data using
dash cameras from two vehicles. The data contains a total of 15
video files. We divided the application into 100 sensing cycles
and each sensing cycle processes video clips of 6 seconds.
To emulate the various data volumes of each raw video data
collected, we randomly sample each video clip between 1 to
15 image frames per second. A collaborative traffic monitoring
computation task is defined as follows.
Computation Tasks for Collaborative Traffic Monitor-
ing: performs feature extraction (optical flow and HOG) to
the original raw image data. The extracted feature is further
processed by the edge server to infer the local traffic condition.
The 15 video files are randomly assigned to the 15 end
devices to emulate the traffic video data collected from them.
We repeat the experiments 100 times to generate the results
discussed below.
1) Quality of Service (Application (Server) Side): In the
first set of experiments, we focus on how the objective is
achieved from the application side. In particular, we evaluate
the end-to-end (E2E) delay and deadline hit rate (DHR) of all
the compared task allocation schemes. These two metrics are
commonly used for evaluating the responsiveness of delay-
sensitive applications [28]. Figure 6 summarizes the E2E
delays of all the schemes. We show the average delays and
the 90% confidence bounds under three scenarios of privacy
settings as shown below.
• High: all end devices hide all information (i.e., choosing
a privacy level of 3).
• Medium: at each sensing cycle, each end devices ran-
domly pick its privacy level in the range of [0,3].
• Low: all end devices disclose all information (i.e., choos-
ing a privacy level of 0).
We have the following observations: 1) our G-PATA scheme
has the least E2E delay and tightest confidence bounds com-
pared to the baselines at medium and high privacy settings; 2)
we observe that G-PATA did not outperform but approaches
the performance of TDA when the edge servers have full
information about the end devices (i.e., under low privacy
setting). This is because TDA is a top-down task allocation
scheme that assumes the server has full control of the end
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device. This is not practical in the edge computing paradigm
and unfair to G-PATA and other baselines that assume end
devices will not share all their device information with the
server due to privacy concerns; 3) the E2E performance of
all schemes degrades when the privacy setting is high due to
the increasing uncertainty of the end device status.
The results demonstrate the effectiveness of G-PATA for
meeting real-time QoS requirements of the application while
constrained by users’ unique privacy requirements. The perfor-
mance gain of the G-PATA is achieved by explicitly modeling
the dynamic status of the end devices (e.g., computation
capability and energy profile) and allocating tasks according
to the current device status. We also observe that G-PATA
significantly outperforms the BGTA scheme because i) G-
PATA develops a privacy-aware negotiation scheme that can
leverage partial information willingly disclosed by the end
devices to perform better task allocation, while BGTA ignores
the privacy settings and assumes the edge servers have zero
knowledge of the end devices; ii) the task allocation overhead
is much less than BGTA due to the introduction of P-Chance
negotiation and inertia term in the DPFP algorithm, which
significantly contributes to the superior E2E delay.
Note that the privacy setting does not affect the bottom-
up baselines including BGTA, COG, and GMXR, due to
the fact that they completely hide the private information
from the server and does not consider the customized privacy
requirement from the users. Therefore, in the subsequent
experiments, we set “medium” as the default privacy setting
for all schemes where all end devices randomly pick their
privacy levels.
The DHR is defined as the ratio of tasks that are completed
within the deadline. The results are shown in Figure 7. Here
we use all 15 end devices and gradually increase the deadline
constraints. We fix the privacy setting as a medium. We
observe that G-PATA has significantly higher DHRs than all
the baselines, and is the first one that reaches 100% DHR as
the deadline increases. We attribute such performance gain to
our deadline-driven dynamic incentive adjustment that guides
the end devices’ decisions towards minimizing deadline miss
rate by providing dynamic incentives.
2) Edge Payoffs (end device Side): In the second set of
experiments, we focus on how the objectives of end devices
are achieved. In particular, we study the payoff of end devices.
Figure 8 shows the results of the payoff gained by the end
devices. We observe that G-PATA has the highest payoff
compared to all the baselines. This is because G-PATA can
most efficiently finish the jobs by pushing the computation to
the edge, thus avoiding the communication latency of sending
tasks to the server. This results in the least penalty for the
rewards gained. Also, G-PATA allows end devices to maxi-
mize their rewards via achieving the Nash Equilibrium. The
negotiation process of DPFP allows G-PATA to significantly
outperform other game-theoretic schemes (i.e., BGTA and
COG) by allowing end devices to collectively work out their
best payoffs given their privacy constraints.
D. Case Study 2: Abnormal Event Detection
The second real-world case study is Abnormal Event
Detection (AED) in social sensing where the goal is to generate
alerts of abnormal events from video data contributed by
camera-enabled sensors (mobile phones, drones, etc.). For
example, in a mobile social sensing project, the participants
are tasked to take videos/images of a location assigned by
the application to help identify abnormal events such as
trespassing, sudden movements, and appearance of unusual
objects. Upon detection of the abnormal events, the application
provides alerts to its subscribed users or the general public.
We use the UCSD Anomaly Detection Dataset [22] which
consists of 98 (50 training, 48 testing) video footages collected
from surveillance cameras that monitor pedestrian walkways
around the UCSD campus. The dataset provides ground truth
labels for two abnormal events: i) detection of non-pedestrian
objects; ii) anomalous pedestrian motion patterns. We treat
this dataset as the video data collected from the end devices
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since our end devices do not have cameras. We assume that
each end device generates one sensor data stream. Each run of
the experiment contains a total of 100 sensing cycles. Within
each sensing cycle, the end devices are tasked to process a total
of 8 seconds of video clips (with each video source sampled
at 20 image frames per cycle). The computation task in the
abnormal event detection application is defined below.
Computation Tasks for Abnormal Event Detection:
performs motion feature extraction (optical flow) and object
detection using Tiny YOLO [66].
1) Quality of Service (Application (Server) Side): We
perform similar experiments as those discussed in the previous
case study. In particular, we evaluate all the schemes in terms
of DHR and E2E delay. The results are shown in Figure 9 and
Figure 10 respectively. We observe similar results of G-PATA
as the previous case study. We also observe that both DHR and
E2E delay results are worse than those in the previous section
for all schemes. The reason is that i) the YOLO framework
used in this application is more computationally intensive than
the previous; ii) more image frames need to be processed per
sensing cycle.
2) Edge Payoffs (end device Side): The results of payoffs
gained at the end devices are shown in Figure 11. We ob-
serve that our scheme continues to provide significantly more
amount of payoffs to the end devices than other baselines. G-
PATA also outperforms TDA in terms of the payoff in this case
study. This again demonstrates that G-PATA is more “user-
friendly” by allowing end devices to obtain more payoffs.
E. Overhead and Scalability Analysis
Figure 13: Overhead of All Schemes vs # of Tasks
In this subsection, we evaluate the algorithm overhead as
well as the scalability of the compared schemes. In this set
of experiments, we first tune the number of end devices while
fixing the number of tasks. We then tune the number of tasks
while fixing the number of devices. Such setting allows us
to observe how the performance of each compared scheme
changes when the workload increases. We use the Collabo-
rative Traffic Monitoring application for this experiment. We
first present the algorithm overhead of each compared scheme
in Figures 12 and 13. We exclude the random assignment
baseline for the apparent reason that it always achieves the
least overhead due to its simplicity. We can observe that
G-PATA starts to outperform baselines when the number of
devices or the number of tasks increases (e.g., >20). This
demonstrates the scalability of the G-PATA. We also found
the performance gain of G-PATA is more significant when
increasing the number of devices as compared to increasing
the number of tasks. This is due to the unique load balancing
technique employed by G-PATA that ensures the algorithmic
workload is evenly distributed across local edge groups. To
take a closer look at the scalability of G-PATA, we further
analyze the convergence and fine-grained algorithmic overhead
of G-PATA when varying the number of devices/tasks in
Figure 14. We can observe that the number of iterations it
takes to converge, as well as the overall overhead of the G-
PATA algorithm grows almost linearly as either the number of
end devices or the number of tasks increases. We again observe
that the number of tasks has a larger impact on the overhead of
the G-PATA algorithm than the number of devices. Note that
in the G-PATA implementation, we make sure the end devices
are split into local groups so that G-PATA is only run on a few
end devices as well as their assigned local edge server. This,
along with the quasi-linear growth of the algorithm, ensure the
overall overhead of the task allocation is manageable.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents the G-PATA framework to solve the
privacy-aware computation task allocation problem in the
SSEC system. The G-PATA framework is motivated by a
unique and practical observation that end users have diversified
privacy requirements. In G-PATA, we develop novel privacy-
aware bottom-up game theoretic framework approaches (i.e.,
ITAG and DPFP) that not only optimize the QoS of the appli-
cation but also ensure the privacy requirements of end users are
well satisfied. A new uncertainty-aware load balancing frame-
work is also developed to efficiently balance the load of the
G-PATA framework when only partial information of the end
devices is available. We implemented the G-PATA framework
on a real-world platform that consists of Nvidia Jetson TK1,
TX1, and Raspberry Pi3 boards. The evaluation results from
two real-world social sensing applications demonstrate that G-
PATA can well protect user defined privacy while achieving
significant performance gain in terms of reducing delay and
deadline miss rate compared to sate-of-the-art baselines.
Our work has some limitations and can be extended in future
research. One limitation lies in addressing security concerns.
In particular, we assume that end devices are not malicious.
However, there may be malicious end devices that intentionally
generate wrong results for tasks. This issue can be addressed
by combining G-PATA with verifiable computing techniques
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Figure 14: Scalability of G-PATA
where the system maintains verifiable results by requiring a
“proof” of the correct execution of tasks [67]. For example, a
peer verification mechanism was proposed in [68] where the
server can duplicate the computation to a judicious selection
set of end devices (with incentives) and detect malicious
attackers by comparing their computation results. Also on the
server side, we assume the server is honest-and-curious, i.e., it
will not falsify the number of tasks for carrying out malicious
attacks other than aggregating user information. In a practical
setting, we can extend G-PATA with recent techniques such
as honeyclients [69] that allows users to proactively detect
malicious server behavior to further enhance the protection
against malicious servers.
Secondly, as mentioned in Section III-C, G-PATA does not
explicitly consider the potential privacy risks that are intro-
duced by examining or linking the raw sensing data provided
by end devices. We can extend G-PATA by integrating it with
existing data privacy protection techniques. For example, vari-
ous data obfuscation techniques have been proposed to sanitize
imagery data and effectively conceal sensitive information in
the images [70], [71]. To address the privacy risk related
to the data linkage, we can leverage techniques such as k-
Unlinkability [72] to make the raw data unlinkable. In future
work, we plan to further investigate the trade-off between the
QoS of the application and the user privacy protection when
applying these data privacy mitigation techniques.
Moreover, G-PATA assumes the end devices follow the
game protocol honestly and only report truthful information.
For example, if a device is in City A, it should not claim to be
in City B. Alternatively, if a device has available CPU of 10%,
it should not claim to have 80-90% available CPU. We can
enforce such an assumption by ensuring that a client program
of G-PATA installed on the end devices is responsible for
identifying and reporting the information of devices. The end
users configure the privacy settings through a GUI and cannot
intentionally modify the reported information. The privacy
setting from user input is provided to the client program
to properly mask the reported information (e.g., hide certain
information that the user is not willing to provide). Therefore,
we only need to ensure the client program is working properly
and reports the truthful information. In cases when end users
do intend to hack the program and report incorrect information
to gain higher rewards, G-PATA can perform software integrity
protection [73], [74] to ensure the client program has not been
tampered with.
Finally, G-PATA does not consider the dynamic churn of end
users. In fact, we assume the availability of devices does not
change within each sensing cycle. In practice, the availability
of users could change at any point in time, which may lead
to unfinished or partially finished tasks [68]. G-PATA can be
extended to address user churn by allocating important tasks to
more than one end device so the task will be finished unless all
devices associated with the task decide to quit simultaneously.
Alternatively, G-PATA can also impose a high penalty cost for
the devices who quit without finishing their tasks. G-PATA also
did not consider the dynamic admission of new users into the
system. The newly participating devices may not be able to
join the game-theoretic task right away until the current users
finish the iterations. We will extend the DPFP scheme to be
able to admit new users within the iterations of the DPFP
algorithm in the future.
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